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RACE IN LEGISLATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

“Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences.”—MILL, *Principles of Political Economy*.

It is a most mistaken idea that Anthropology is purely speculative and abstract. It is, on the contrary, more intimately related than any other branch of science to the sympathies of humanity, and, we may add, the utilities and requirements of society. It enters into every question connected with religion, government, commerce, and culture, which are all more or less affected by racial endowment and proclivity. This, however, is a comparatively new idea, on which the statesman and the legislator are yet scarcely prepared to act, and to which the theologian manifests not merely indifference, but repugnance. Practically, indeed, the element of race has not yet obtained recognition, as one of the underlying conditions and modifying forms of civilisation. We must not blame the world for this. Scientific Anthropology is a thing of yesterday; nor is the study of it yet sufficiently advanced to justify its believers in claiming the reverent attention of duly cultured minds to their hastily formed conclusions. They must be content to wait and work, sowing the seed of truth to-day, that mankind may reap its golden harvest on some far off to-morrow. In the meantime, however, its advocates will only be performing a proper duty in occasionally enforcing its claims on the attention of our more advanced thinkers, preparatory, let us trust, to their full recognition by the general voice of civilised society.

In this endeavour to commend Anthropology to more general acceptance, we must not hide from ourselves that two great schools are, on principle, decidedly opposed to our pretensions. These two

influential parties, while differing widely from each other on many other points, at least cordially agree in discarding and even denouncing the truths of Anthropology. They do so because these truths are directly opposed to their cardinal principle of absolute and original equality among mankind. The parties to which we refer are the orthodox, and more especially the evangelical body, in religion, and the ultra-liberal and democratic party in politics. The former proceed on the traditions of Eden and the Flood, and on the assertion, that of one blood God made all the nations of the earth; the latter base their notions on certain metaphysical assumptions and abstract ideas of political right and social justice, as innocent of scientific data, that is, of the fact as it is in nature, as the wildest of the theological figments which set Exeter Hall in periodical commotion, at the never-failing anniversaries of missionary enterprise.

We fear that it is in vain to argue with the religious portion of our opponents. People whose opinions are based on dogma possess a fortress not easily assailed by reason. They know in what they believe, and from the vantage ground of a supernatural revelation can afford to laugh at the indications of history and the deductions of science. They are persuaded themselves, and they have persuaded a very large section of society, that one religion, their own, will do for all mankind to the end of time. And society believes them, or, at all events, is too ignorant or too busy to oppose this tremendous assumption. And so we subscribe a million a year, and send out good men and true into all climes, it may be truly said, in denial of the past and defiance of the present.

Our political opponents are not exactly persons of this stamp. They do not profess any particular faith in written records. They are not prepared to enthrone an eastern myth on the denial of modern science. They do not intentionally prefer dogma to fact. Opposed to an hereditary aristocracy in the body politic, they are prone to deny the wider and more-enduring aristocracy of race. Believers in the omnipotence of circumstances, they refuse to recognise the aids or the obstacles of inherent endowment. To them, humanity is one from the educational stand point, as it is also one to the theologians from the creational stand point. The latter assert that a Negro or a Mongol will make as good a Christian as the most finely-developed Caucasian, and the former equally affirm that, with proper training, he will make as good a citizen, as skilful a craftsman, as fine an artist, and as able a poet or philosopher. We do not mean to say that the latter put their conclusions exactly into these words. They dare not. The plain practical good sense of society would prove too much for them were they to do so. But their assertions, as far as they mean

anything, imply this, and are indeed mere idle rhodomontade, if they do not.

And here, perhaps some of our Anthropological friends may be of opinion, that in seriously opposing such absurdities, we are guilty of the folly of the worthy Knight of La Mancha, when he ran a tilt at the windmills. But in truth these absurdities, from their wide acceptance, are gradually becoming productive of very grave consequences. The stupendous claims of the Romish hierarchy to the sacerdotal supremacy of the world, are based on the prior assumption of a possible unity among all nations in religious belief and practice, and on the mundane and unending mission of Papal Christianity. The atrocities of the Spaniards in Peru and Mexico were but the dark conclusions, wrought out by the logic of events, from these startling premises. The wars of the reformation were humanity's assertion of its right to differ,—were, in short, the counter-proclamation of the Teuton in opposition to the claims of the Roman. The watchwords of modern revolution, “liberty, equality and fraternity,” more especially the two latter, together with all the absurdities and impossibilities of communism, are but the sinister yet legitimate progeny of the principle of primal and organic equality. The mischief of such views, indeed, is not and cannot be confined to the sphere of speculation. They of necessity invade the field of action, where thought ultimates itself in deeds. They influence most of the colonial enterprises of modern times ; and they were at the foundation of the recent civil war in America, and underlie not only the claim of the freedmen to the suffrage, but all the contemplated horrors and abominations of miscegenation.

We have, in a previous paper on Race in History, already touched on some of the errors of one of the schools to which we have been alluding, that of the Political Economists and Legislative Reformers. But, in doing so, we confined our remarks almost wholly to the works of one of the youngest of its disciples, the historian Buckle. But he was only an echo of his masters, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as they are but a continuation of Helvetius and the French Encyclopedists, who were again but a far-off reverberation of Democritus and Epicurus. There is a terrible tyranny in ideas. Your principles, even though they be the most fallacious assumptions, will ultimate themselves in legitimate conclusions sooner or later. John Stuart Mill cannot help claiming the suffrage for the Negro—and the woman. Such conclusions are the inevitable result of the premises whence he started. And had he paused at such a *reductio ad absurdum*, his school would not. That school, as we have said, dates from the remotest antiquity. The omnipotence of circumstances

and the natal equality of mankind are not new doctrines. They are simply materialism, and the philosophy of the external ultimatum. He who starts from atoms, guided by chance, must end in absolute democracy, that is, in racial and individual equality. It is simply the completion of the circle, from chaos to chaos.

It need scarcely be said that such a school can only exist in words or upon paper, for it is in direct contradiction to fact. Nature is a grand hierarchy of cosmic and telluric organisms. Her suns rule their subordinate planets, surrounded again by their subject satellites. The vegetable and animal kingdoms are a succession of organic stages, separated, as Swedenborg would say, by "discrete degrees." While at the very apex of this pyramid of form and function, we find regal man, the virtual king of the earthly sphere. And are we to suppose that this hierarchical arrangement ceases here; that there are no innate and hereditarily transmissible diversities among men? Reason as well as fact revolts at so absurd a conclusion. Had we, from our limited geographical range, experience only of one race, we might most legitimately conclude there were others in the distance,—a conclusion now adequately substantiated by geographical discovery. But John Stuart Mill cannot see this. His intellectual prepossessions are too strong for such a grasp of veracity. His mind is so filled with the *idola* of Codification and Political Economy, that he cannot see the simple yet unspeakably important facts of Anthropology.

Let not these remarks on Mr. Mill be misunderstood. He is the last man to intentionally maintain an untruth. Privileged to own one of the clearest and most logically constituted heads, and we may add, one of the noblest hearts in Christendom, he unites the deductive power of the race whence he descends, and we may add, of the school to which he belongs, with somewhat of their infirmity, in the too facile rejection or assumption of premises. No man marches more carefully from the major to the minor; the process, in such hands at least, is unerring. But, alas for the major. It may be the sublimest of truths, an axiom on which the universe could repose unshaken for eternity, or, as in the present case, a fallacy so transparent, that the simplest cabin-boy, on his homeward voyage, would see its infantile absurdity.

The rejection of truth is perilous, perhaps we might say fatal, to all men. But it must prove especially so to the priesthood of intellect,—to those sages and philosophers, who as legislators, political economists, historians, and men of science, endeavour to explain the truth and the right to others; for when the shepherds go astray, it is no wonder that the flock generally follow. To write of men, and to legislate for men, while rejecting the science of man, is certainly a most extra-

ordinary and by no means commendable procedure. And yet it was that of Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Henry Buckle, and is that of John Stuart Mill. The first drew up a code, or shall we say, laid down the principles of codification in the abstract—ignoring diversity of race. The second wrote his otherwise admirable history, and the last has given us the principles of Political Economy, together with sundry treatises on Liberty and Representative Government, not only ignoring, but directly and almost offensively denying the great truth of racial diversity. Ignoring the fact in nature, that men differ in the relative proportion of their passions, affections, sentiments and faculties. Ignoring what is patent, not only to the Anthropologist, but to the soldier, the sailor, and the man of business, that the races of mankind differ in the force of their propensities, in the strength of their sympathies, in the power of their principles, in the accuracy of their perceptions, and in the clearness and the vigour of their thoughts. Ignoring not only the conclusions of the man of science, but the practical experience of all widely-travelled persons, that there are distinctly marked Ethnic diversities, in virtue of which the grander divisions of mankind differ in the persistence of their will, in their power to resist temptation, in their susceptibility to impulse, in their ability for work, and in their innate capacity for literature, science and art. And ignoring therefore what the experience of ages has demonstrated, and what the true wisdom of the present would dictate, the necessity for a diversity of religion and government corresponding to this diversity of race, whereby the formal institutions of a people are brought into harmony with their mental constitution.

These are severe remarks. Let not their spirit be misunderstood. It is because we respect their advocates, that we are so harsh in our judgment of the doctrines. Error is formidable in proportion to the ability, and, we may add, the virtue of those who hold it. The fallacies of men like Bentham, Mill, and Buckle, cannot be harmless. Such minds cast the halo of their glory around even their grossest errors, and just in proportion as we revere them for the good which they have accomplished, must we be stern in our opposition to the evil of which they are unintentionally the authors. Of such it may be truly said, "if their light be darkness, how great is that darkness!" If their views be founded on error, how widely diffused must that error be! It is the very greatness of the men that necessitates our more serious antagonism to their fallacies. They are too powerful, too influential, to allow us to pass over their mistakes in silence. The voice which has been oracular for the truth, becomes doubly formidable when employed as the trumpet-blast of error.

In the history of Philosophy, in so far as we can be said to possess

anything deserving of the name, nothing is more remarkable than the power of the schools. Like religious sects, they take the individual helplessly captive, and lead him whithersoever they will. They close his eyes to one phase of truth, and they open them to another. Nor does any amount of talent or attainment appear to constitute an adequate safeguard against this despotism. It only makes the individual a more or less apt instrument for the acceptance and promulgation of their doctrines. He is obviously the organ of a greater power, that sees beyond him, and uses him for a grander purpose, than anything of which he is conscious. This is the case with Mr. Mill. It was equally so with Jeremy Bentham. They are the organs of negation. In reality, the champions of matter *versus* spirit. It is their vocation to proclaim the weight and value of *quantity* as opposed to quality. They ignore the ONE. They enthrone the *many*. They do not stand alone in this. They have not only a large following, but they have had many able precursors, and they have many powerful coadjutors. They represent the spirit of the age. Their works are simply Protestantism, logically ultimated in the political sphere. Fourier went beyond them, and carried it into the social, where it eventuated in communism. Let it not be supposed that in saying this, we pass a judgment of condemnation upon these truly great and deservedly illustrious men. Their cause is perfectly legitimate. It represents one of the two great poles of universal truth. But it is only one pole, and that not the *positive*. These are rather daring assertions. We know it, and must now proceed to their confirmation.

It was a grand saying, that all minds are either Platonic or Aristotelean, subjective or objective, spiritual or material in their essential character and tendencies. This, however, is only saying that men must obey the laws of polarity, the most gifted and earnest being generally the most strongly pronounced in their proclivities. But it is not only men as individuals, but men collectively, who have to obey these laws, and so manifest the spirit of the ages. In a sense, as was shown in some former numbers of this Journal, the entire movement of humanity, in the North-western march of civilisation throughout the historic period, was, intellectually speaking, a descent from the highly spiritualised theosophy of the Orient to the thoroughly-materialised science of the Occident. Now it is this movement in its ultimates, which is represented by Mr. Mill. As we have said, it is a great and legitimate movement, and even in its extremes, deserves to have such a champion to stand up for it. As the protest of reason against dogma in religion, as the testimony of *à posteriori* fact against *à priori* assumption in philosophy, and as the claim of the rights of the many against the tyranny of the few in

politics, it was a great and noble cause, deserving of all honour and worthy of all success. But when, overstepping these boundaries, it proceeds with its political logic to the denial of inconvenient facts, it is no longer a legitimate movement, but, on the contrary, one demanding strenuous opposition, and deserving utter and shameful defeat. It has reached this stage in the hands of Mr. Mill and his coadjutors. They deny the facts of race, and hence our opposition.

We thus see that this great movement is in conflict with itself. Its several sections are no longer in harmony with each other. Its religion and its politics are at war with its science. We have arrived at the beginning of the end. In the fervour of religious propagandism, it demands one faith for all mankind. And in its enthusiasm for liberty, it proclaims that all men may be politically free, when they have been adequately educated. In attempting to maintain these stupendous assumptions, it does not condescend to investigate observed facts; but meets the testimony of travellers, and the conclusions of Anthropologists by the annunciation of abstract principles, in reality by a process of *à priori* reasoning, as opposed to the evidence of *à posteriori* experience. By the dread compulsion of a false position, it is driven to the desperate alternative of ignoring nature and denying phenomena. It does so, because nature and her phenomena are opposed to its conclusions. Again, we admit these are very severe remarks. But they only express the simple truth, and hence our reason for their publication.

We make our appeal to nature. Let us hear what she has to say. The earth, at her different zones of latitude and longitude, or shall we say in other language, on her several areas, has specially characterised types, vegetable and animal, bestial and human. These specialities are obviously not accidental. They are transmissible and enduring, and far antedate all history. The law of distribution is yet beyond us; but it is evident that there is such a law, for we see its effects. And we see them in the human sphere as distinctly as in any other. The men of one Ethnic area are not to be confounded with the men of another. Nor are these distinctions simply physical and organic, they extend also to habits and capacities. We know that this is denied by Mr. Mill and his school. But such denial necessitates the rejection of history as well as of science; for history is conclusive as to racial diversity, its annals being in truth but a record of the result of that diversity. For example, to affirm that a Negro is in every way as good a man as an European, is to deny the historic testimony of five thousand years, seeing that in all that time no Negro nation has ever, either with or without assistance, reached the civilisation, again and again achieved in the great centres of Caucasian

culture. To say after this that Negro communities *might* have done so, is simply to beg the question, and take for granted the very thing in dispute. They have not done so, even with the tuition of Egypt and the example of Carthage; and if our inquiry is to be conducted on *à posteriori* principles of investigation, we must accept the fact of their non-civilisation as in so far conclusive of their incapacity. They have been tried and found wanting. But this historic evidence is corroborated by their organic inferiority. The comparative anatomist agrees with the historian in placing them on a lower level than the European. And the phrenologist agrees with the comparative anatomist. We know that Mr. Mill does not believe in phrenology, nor we presume in physiognomy. He cannot. Either the one or the other would dissipate his day-dream of racial equality within an hour of its acceptance. The inferior character of the Negro is as distinctly stamped on his organisation as on his destiny, and only minds blinded by the *idola* of preconceived ideas could fail to see the one as well as the other, and to find in both unmistakeable evidence of the Negro's lower position in the scale of being.

Similar remarks may be made on the Mongolian races of Eastern Asia. Their structure, while superior to that of the Negro, is inferior to that of the European. It is less developed. As the type of the Negro is fœtal, that of the Mongol is infantile. And in strict accordance with this we find that their government, literature and art are infantile also. They are beardless children, whose life is a task, and whose chief virtue consists in unquestioning obedience. Were Mr. Mill an anthropologist, we might point out to him the very important physiological fact, that an immemorial civilisation has utterly failed to Caucasianise either the Chinese or Japanese, they being still as essentially Mongolian as the rudest nomad of the northern steppes. But he would place no value on such a fact. It could have no significance from his standpoint. Form and function are to him matters of as much indifference as colour, which he avowedly ignores. He cannot understand why a Chinaman, under adequately favourable circumstances, should not become as good a sculptor as Phidias, or as inspired a poet as Shakspeare. And the reason why he cannot understand this is, that he ignores the racial element in humanity; in other words, he allows his *preconceived* idea of aboriginal unity and essential equality to dominate all structural evidence of diversity, and all historical evidence of inequality. This we know is equivalent to saying that his mind is not open to the truth when nature is the witness, and her testimony is opposed to his cherished ideas and favourite speculations. A severe sentence to pass on England's greatest living logician. But it is out of his own mouth we convict him. It is on the evidence afforded by his own works that we pronounce his condemnation.

Now let it be distinctly understood that we say this of Mr. Mill only in his representative character, as the chief of a rather extreme school of political economists. As an individual, no living man has a greater regard for veracity. Even in his gravest errors he is perfectly honest, and when blinded to the truth by his deepest prejudices, feels fully persuaded that he is simply consistent in maintaining a principle. Moreover, it should be remembered that he does not stand alone in ignoring racial diversity. His views, however erroneous, are not individual crotchets, but the well considered and avowed opinions of a large and influential school of thinkers, and as such deserving of the most respectful consideration, even from anthropologists, who so clearly see the egregious fallacies on which they rest. We must not blame men for differing from us. It is our business to provide them with such evidence, as shall suffice to produce a conviction of the truth, and if we fail in this, the fault is not theirs but ours.

What then is the gravamen of our charge against Mr. Mill and his friends? And we reply the unwarranted application of experiences, obtained only from the European race, to the whole of humanity. And as an accompaniment of this, the substitution of art in the place of nature in the process of legislation. As already remarked, these errors are due to the preponderance of abstract ideas over concrete experience. They result from that process of hasty and incautious generalisation, against which Francis of Verulam especially warned his followers. Because certain kinds of government, and certain processes in legislation, have proved successful in Europe, it is at once concluded, that they are abstractedly right and good, and should with all convenient speed be applied to every other family of man. And as these governments are representative and this legislation has been senatorial, it is supposed that such forms and modes of transacting matters gubernatorial, must be the acme of perfection in the way of example, and to which, therefore, the rule of all peoples should be made to gradually approximate, the only consideration being, the kind and degree of culture they may have previously undergone in the way of preparation. Of innate fitness or unfitness, of organic aptitude or inaptitude, these sages of the closet know nothing. Of hereditarily transmissible types of body and mind they are happily ignorant. For ineradicable proclivities, they have a sovereign contempt. "*Racial specialities*" they hold to be a figment of the anthropological imagination, and for which they would substitute "*educational differences*". To their view, races, or as they would say, nations are what circumstances have made them, and consequently alter the circumstances, and in due time you change the race! As already remarked, the logic is sound, but the premises are faulty. They are so, because they fail to take an important element

of the problem into account, we mean the subject-matter on which the circumstances are supposed to operate.

Let us see indeed for what such logic would suffice, were the premises obtained from another ethnic area. Asia has been immemorially the seat of despotism. Its idea of authority is essentially unitary. Its codes, in so far as they have grown, are the cumulative result of the successive edicts of absolute sovereigns. But in their grand outlines and fundamental principles, they were the products of a single legislator, some divinely inspired Menu, Moses, or Mohammed, who derived his authority not from without but within, not from the people but from God, and whose short but effective preamble was "thus saith the Lord." Now whether under Assyrian or Saracen, this was doubtless esteemed the better way. But conceive of its application to Greek, or Roman, or Teuton, above all to these same Anglo-Saxon free-thinking political economists themselves! Again we must remind Mr. Mill that there is a religion and a government, a literature and an art, which is specially adapted not only to the outward circumstances but to the inherent and innate qualities of each of the grander divisions of mankind.

In these illustrations we have hitherto purposely omitted any allusion to the more savage races, all quite susceptible of civilisation according to the principles of Mr. Mill, who will not admit that the Australian, the Andaman islander, and the Hottentot labour under any *inherent* incapacity for attaining to the highest culture of ancient Greece or modern Europe! Their present inferiority is an accident, due to a combination of unfavourable circumstances. They might have been the foremost men of all this world but for certain untoward influences. To say anything about the Andaman head and the Hottentot brain is only "a vulgar mode of escaping from the consideration of the effect of *social* and *moral* influences on the human mind!" Now anthropologists do not deny the power of social and moral influences, but they affirm that in conjunction with these the organic conditions and the transmissible mental constitution of their human subject-matter must also be taken into the account. This Mr. Mill denies, and hence his errors, both theoretical and practical, which we must now proceed to examine in detail.

In his otherwise excellent treatise on "Representative Government," Mr. Mill speaks of savage people and civilised people, and of the means by which the former may be gradually raised to the condition of the latter. Of the possibility of this process he has not the smallest misgiving. The idea that there are *savage races*, adapted by structure and temperament, by habit of body and constitution of mind for the savage state, has obviously never occurred to him. He thinks a savage tribe

is like an ignorant individual, in want only of education, simply that and nothing more. It is the same with his idea of civilised races. He clearly thinks they might be absolutely savage. Taking the past upon trust, like a true closet-scholar putting unquestioning faith in his *books*, he closes his eyes to the present. Having read certain vague traditions about the ancestors of the Greeks and Romans, French and English having once been in a savage state, it has never occurred to him to test the accuracy of this statement, by looking round upon the world of to-day, to see if there be such a phenomenon as a really savage people of Caucasian type. We can readily understand that such a procedure would be in opposition to all his established habitudes of mind, and of this we do not complain. Only we say that such a thinker will prove a very unsafe guide as to the government of any race save his own.

In the same work he speaks of the arrestment of certain civilised nations at the stage of a paternal despotism, instancing the Egyptians and Chinese, with whom he contrasts the far more free and progressive Jews. The stagnation of the former he attributes to the strength of their institutions, which would not break down to permit of national growth, while the unorganised institution of the prophets among the latter people, by ensuring a greater degree of liberty, permitted also of more effective progress. All which is, no doubt, quite true. But then it is not the whole truth, only that, indeed, which lies on the surface. It does not tell us *why* the institutions of the one people were so restrictive and those of the other so comparatively elastic. This, as every anthropologist knows, must be sought in diversity of race—in the ethnic fact that the Chinese are a Mongolic people, and that the higher castes of Egypt were clogged by a numerically preponderant mass of African aborigines; while the Jews, and we may add the Phœnicians, were the most vigorously constituted of all the Asiatic Caucasians, and, indeed, present so many European elements in their national character, that the perfect purity of their oriental descent is still open to considerable suspicion. But of all this Mr. Mill and his school know nothing, and want to know nothing; and while obtaining full credit with the yet more ignorant public for being very profound, are in point of fact childishly superficial in their habitual treatment of this and all similar topics. They stop short at effects, and mistaking these for causes, think they have exhausted a subject, of which in truth they have scarcely broken the surface.

Mr. Mill's rejection of race, like the errors of all decisive minds, is thorough. It pervades his entire system. Hence he treats even of slavery without an allusion to this important element. Thus he speaks of the facility with which slaves, when manumitted, assumed the position and discharged the duties of freemen among the Greeks and

Romans, which he attributes to the existence of an industrious class who were neither slaves or slave-owners. Now there is no doubt that this was a very favourable circumstance, but what would it have availed if the freedmen had differed from their owners and the industrious middle-class, as the Negroes of the States do from the Caucasian population around them? The learned freedmen of Rome were often, racially speaking, of as good blood as their masters. And there is no doubt that even the Helots did not differ from the Spartans more than the Anglo-Saxons from the Normans. Under such circumstances, the individual emancipation of superior slaves, is perfectly easy, nor is there the least wonder that the well-educated among them at once assumed a respectable and recognised position in society. Nor with such conditions is there ultimately any insuperable difficulty in the emancipation of the whole class, either gradually, as throughout south-western Europe during the middle ages, or even suddenly as in Russia and Hungary in our own day, by an imperial edict or by a senatorial decree. The absorption of such liberated bondsmen, into the class of freemen, is comparatively easy, because their inferiority is simply social and not organic. But it is quite otherwise, where the inferiority is stamped upon the organisation, and where consequently the freedman and his children's children to the remotest generation, bear indelible traces of their descent from the servile caste.

Now again we say that the deservedly illustrious name of John Stuart Mill, ought not to cover the grave errors into which he has been led on this subject by his unwise rejection of the racial element, a rejection which by enabling him to speak of slavery in the abstract, has permitted him to confound the purely domestic institution of the better days of Greece and Rome, with the grosser chatteldom of negro slavery in our own times. This, for instance, is his portraiture of the slave proper:—

“A slave properly so called, is a being who has not learnt to help himself. He is, no doubt, one step in advance of the savage. He has not the first lesson of political society still to acquire. He has learnt to obey. But what he obeys is only a direct command. It is the characteristic of *born* slaves to be incapable of conforming their conduct to a rule or law. They can only do what they are ordered, and only when they are ordered to do it. If a man whom they fear is standing over them and threatening them with punishment, they obey; but when his back is turned, the work remains undone. The motive determining them must appeal not to their interests but to their instincts; immediate hope or immediate terror.”

Now it need scarcely be said that this is a picture of negro slavery, and that, too, in its very worst form, that of the recently imported African savage working on a plantation. Here again it is obvious that

Mr. Mill has been misled by the undue predominance of abstract ideas over concrete experience. His "slave" is, in reality, an abstraction covering the immense gulph which separates a Plato, who was once sold as a slave by the order of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, from a Congo negro. Assuredly, with all his subservience to ideas and his indifference to facts, Mr. Mill must know that the Greek or Circassian slave of a Turkish emir is a very different being from the woolly haired and thick-lipped Ethiopian, who occupies a yet lower servile position in the same household. Though equally slaves, as being bought with a price, they are yet inherently and essentially wide as the poles asunder, as their rude and ignorant but nevertheless practical master clearly perceives. History informs us that the Mamelukes of Egypt were all purchased slaves from the Caucasus. Does Mr. Mill think their ranks could have been as well recruited from the countries south of the Sahara? But there is no need of multiplying instances. The man who does not know that the social condition of the slave, both during his serfdom and after his manumission, is largely influenced by his racial relationship to, or difference from, his master, has yet, not only his anthropology but his history to acquire.

Closely connected with his deficiencies and misconceptions on the subject of slavery, and originating doubtless in the same fundamental error, is the omission by Mr. Mill of any allusion to hybridism, as an obstruction to the formation and maintenance of a stable government. It is, of course, quite legitimate in *logic*, for the man who does not believe in race, to deny or ignore the existence of half-castes. But, unfortunately, nature will not so ignore them, as Mexico and the South American republics have found to their cost. Where the parental elements are very diverse, the hybrid is himself a fermenting monstrosity. He is ever a more or less chaotic compound. He is in conflict with himself, and but too often exhibits the vices of both parents without the virtues of either. He is a blot on creation, the product of a sin against nature, whom she hastens with all possible expedition to reduce to annihilation. He is not in healthful equilibrium, either mental or physical, and consequently cannot conduce to the stability of anything else. He is ever oscillating between his paternal and maternal proclivities. His very instincts are perverted. He unites the baseness of the negro with the aspirations of the European; and while the creature of ungovernable appetite, longs for that liberty which is only compatible with self-command. Such are the many-coloured many-featured "curs" that abound in most of the colonial populations of modern times, produced, as we have said, by our having overstepped the boundaries of nature in the mixture of races.

Now in any work on Liberty and Representative Government, it

surely behoved the writer to take such an element as this into account. And the fact that he has not done so, renders these otherwise admirable productions of Mr. Mill of very inferior value, even in reference to the very subject which they profess to elucidate. Judging by the time-honoured examples of Egypt and India, the only safe procedure with such a population of hybrids, is the institution and rigid maintenance of caste, to which, under such circumstances, things naturally tend, as we see among our transatlantic brethren at the present day. It was, perhaps in part, for the want of this regulation in adequate force, that Carthage ultimately succumbed to Rome; for while his splendid Numidian cavalry undoubtedly helped Hannibal to some of his earlier victories, the mingled mobs at home contributed yet more effectually to his final defeat.

And thus we are brought to the great question of political and individual liberty contemplated from the ethnic stand-point. Now it need scarcely be said even to the tyro in anthropology that this is pre-eminently a question of race as well as culture, while Mr. John Stuart Mill treats of it throughout as simply a matter of collective educational preparation. Liberty and slavery are with him equally the possibility of all peoples. That the higher races are inherently more qualified for both political and individual liberty than the lower, he ignores in one place and denies by implication in another. In this he is quite consistent. It is an unavoidable corollary from the premiss of equality, but then, as already remarked, this premiss is itself an assumption of which those most familiar with anthropological science have the most doubt.

Were it not that we are steeled by habit to such proceedings, it might, perhaps, prove matter for grave reflection, that in the midst of our inductive era a school of thinkers can still be found, who independently of all detailed examination of the fact, dare to make the great affirmation of racial equality. That the religious world should do this does not surprise us. It is an accordance with the mediæval proclivities of theological thought. But it is otherwise with Mr. Mill and his followers, of whom, but for their uninquiring subservience to preconceived ideas, we might expect better things. Only think what this affirmation implies. Nothing less than a detailed knowledge of the passional impulses, the moral principles, and the intellectual faculties of all the various divisions of mankind. Why, the collective information of all the Anthropological Societies in existence, lands us only at the very threshold of such knowledge. And that collective information, be it remembered, as year by year it gradually increases, only brings us the more surely to a settled conviction of *existing* diversity, which is, moreover, so marked and found to consist in such very important anatomical

and physiological differences, that the growing conviction among most anthropological students is, that this so strongly marked diversity, is aboriginal, and consequently ineradicable. But whatever may be the value of these convictions, those who hold them have at least been guided in their search after truth by the laws of induction. They have examined the facts, they have investigated the data, and have deduced their conclusions from the elements so obtained. While Mr. Mill, disdaining such laborious processes, leaps at once, according to the old high *à priori* method, to the magnificent assumption of racial equality, and then proceeds in undoubting confidence to all its far-stretching conclusions and momentous consequences.

But postponing for the present any further consideration of his processes, let us glance at Mr. Mill's assumption, that the capacity for liberty is simply a question of educational preparation, and with which, race has nothing whatever to do. What says history on the aptitude of the various divisions of mankind for political liberty. And here we must carefully distinguish between the wild license of the savage and the legalised liberty of the civilised citizen of a constitutional state. There is, no doubt, plenty of the former in the Indian wigwams of America, or the Hottentot kraals of South Africa, but such license is only a prelude to the direst despotism, at the first dawn of civilisation, as we see in the case of the Indian monarchies of Peru and Mexico. It is the same with the rude freedom of the Mongolic nomads, which at once degenerates into the paternal despotism of China, as soon as they have exchanged their migratory habits as shepherds, for the settled occupations which accompany agriculture and its necessary concomitants in the mechanical arts. Leaving savagism then behind, where, in truth, we do not so much see the presence of liberty as the absence of government, what Negroid or Mongolic peoples have ever developed constitutional freedom such as that once existing at Athens and Rome, and now enjoyed in Britain and the United States. Nay, what people far removed from the Ethnic area of Europe have ever accomplished this? For the Ionian Greeks, the Jews and the Phœnicians, together with the Carthaginian descendants of the latter, were at least Mediterranean races; and as we have already observed, with many European characteristics. And of the peoples of Europe, do all show an equal aptitude for liberty? Leaving out the classic type, as being in a sense historically past, do the existing Teutons, Celts and Slavons manifest the same capacity for achieving and retaining liberty? We would not however dwell too forcibly on the diversities in this respect, at present attaching to the various members of the great and nobly-endowed European family, as we are quite willing to admit, that many of these specialities are

largely, if not wholly due to educational accidents. And indeed we are prepared to acknowledge, that all Caucasian types on the European area, may, with due preparation, be found fit for working the complex machinery of a constitutional monarchy. History, however, informs us that the Classic and Teutonic divisions alone have yet shown any decided and inherent qualification for political liberty, and that where there is not at least a large admixture of one or both, liberty is either wholly absent or enjoyed by a very fitful and uncertain tenure.

But distinct from, if not above and beyond political liberty, is that which attaches to the individual. Men may be politically free, yet socially enslaved. They may not dare to say or do what the law allows, being overawed by the despotism of fashion or the prescription of precedent. This is the state of the great majority of respectable persons throughout Europe. But history narrates instances where this authority of custom has been fossilised into law. Egypt and India are notable examples. Here again Mr. Mill treats this subject in the abstract, quite independently of all considerations of race, and yet, as in the case of political liberty, it obviously has some connection with type. Some races submit far more slavishly to the tyranny of custom than others. In the lower types, indeed, individuality, in the nobler sense of that very expressive and much-embracing term, is, strictly speaking, unknown. This is a subject deserving of far more investigation than it has yet received. There is obviously more individuality in the Teutonic than the Celtic type. There was, perhaps, more of it in the Roman than the Greek, and there is decidedly more of it in the European than the Asiatic. Speaking nationally, there is more of it in England than in France, and more of it in lowland Scotland than in England.

In the treatment of this subject we must carefully distinguish between those moral monstrosities who are only marked by oddity, by crochets in thought, and eccentricities in action, from those truly individualised personalities, really characterised by originality and by its accompanying independence in thought and conduct. The latter are doubtless rare in all races, and when carefully studied are generally found to present *physical* as well as moral attributes indicative of peculiarly effective development, at least in certain directions. The head and face of Cæsar, were, no doubt, especially Roman. He did not depart from his racial type by anything at all abnormal. Yet he was a unique individuality. He was so because he was the most strongly pronounced, shall we say it, the most distinctly specialised, mentally and physically, of all his racially vigorous countrymen.

This matter goes down to great depths. We would not willingly fatigue even the general reader by a set treatise, aiming to be

exhaustive; but without a few more remarks and illustrations, it is impossible that our meaning should be fully understood. Specialisation is the test of development. From the zoophyte to man the march is steadily in this direction. In the vegetable kingdom it is the blossom and the fruit that constitute the individual—never fully born out of the maternal matrix, the plant proper, being strictly speaking, a congeries of imperfectly developed individualities, that never advance beyond the foetal stage. We have the analogues of this in the corals, the polypi, and the mollusca, and growing fainter, in the spawn of fish. This, however, is simply the stage of physical aggregation, above and beyond which is that of the moral sphere. The ant and the bee have no distinct individuality of will and character. They are the blind and unresisting instrumentalities of a common purpose. They are the integral parts of a larger whole—the hill or the hive. Now, among men, the community is the plant, the hive, the moral matrix, whereto all its human blossoms still inhere.

We begin now then to understand how it is that the higher races manifest more individuality than the lower; they are less foetal in their character, both morally and physically. It has been long observed that the Negroid and Mongolic races are far less distinctly marked physiognomically than the Caucasian. They keep much closer to the common type; we may add, in mind as well as body. And among Caucasian peoples, the same remark applies to the Slavons, who are, it may be observed parenthetically, to Europe, what the Mongols proper are to Asia, the imperfectly-developed children of the North-eastern wilderness.

Again in this inquiry, as in that connected with the aptitude of various races for political liberty, we must carefully distinguish between the uncultured rudeness of the savage, and the true individuality of the vigorously constituted citizen of some free, yet civilised community. The first is only raw material waiting for the stamp of social despotism. It is simply wax, wanting nothing but the seal. Neither must we wholly ignore the influence of institutions, on the spirit of successive ages. Thus, for example, we quite agree with Mr. Mill that our more immediate present, is less favourable to individuality, at least in the outward life, than some ages which have preceded it. We are less under the tyranny of power, but we are more under the despotism of fashion, than the men of the eighteenth century. These oscillations are unavoidable, even in the highest races, whose strongly individualised members constituting but a small minority, are ever liable to suffer by “the pressure from without,” on the part of the numerically preponderant mediocrity, by whom they

are surrounded. But this is something very distinct from the inherent tendency to fossilisation manifested by Asiatics, more especially those of the farther Orient. Yet, from his neglect of all racial considerations, Mr. Mill confounds these two things, and falls into precisely the same error as Dr. Draper, whose fallacies as to the cyclical repetition in Europe of the course of thought and action characteristic of China, were exposed in some remarks on race in history in our October Number (xi) for 1865. Towards the conclusion of the third chapter of his otherwise admirable work on liberty, where he is speaking of "individuality, as one of the elements of wellbeing," Mr. Mill warns us that "the modern *régime* of public opinion is, in an unorganised form, what the Chinese educational and political systems are in an organised ; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedents, and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China." Here it is very obvious that the acute logician is in blissful ignorance of any ethnic distinctions as attaching to Mongolic China, or Caucasian Europe. In other words, he proceeds in his argument on the utterly fallacious assumption, that the racial element in the problem is identical in both instances, whereas, the merest tyro in Anthropology could inform him that the diversity is not only great, but greater than it is yet possible to define in all its elements of corporeal structure and mental constitution, and in the far-reaching consequences resulting from them.

But, lest we should labour under any misapprehension in this matter, Mr. Mill thus proceeds in his next paragraph. "What is it that has preserved Europe from this lot? What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? *Not any superior excellence in them*, which, when it exists, exists as the effect, and not as the cause ; *but their remarkable diversity of character* and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another : they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable." And farther on, "Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths, for its progressive and many-sided development." Oh, Anthropological reader, how shall we proceed to define such science and such *logic* as the foregoing? How speak with due severity, yet with proper respect, of such *self-contradictory* utterances, more especially from the mouth of the master? Shall we leave the matter, duly emphasised with italics, which, of course, are our own, to speak for itself, or shall we endeavour to make such palpable absurdities still more palpable. For the Anthropologist, most assuredly, nothing more is needed than the quotation, its own all-sufficient answer. Not,

however, to be too severe on Mr. Mill, we may observe that the direct contradiction involved in the italicised divisions of his sentence, arises from the fact, that in accordance with the principles of his school, he regards character as being *wholly* the product of circumstances, and not of circumstances acting on organisation. We must remember that he does not believe in ethnic areas, nor in zones of population. That the earth, in virtue of its telluric, climatic, and other influences, can and does produce different kinds of plants and animals, he would readily admit. But his political idols utterly forbid his applying the same principles to, or seeing correspondent facts in man. If a Chinaman differs from an Englishman, this, according to his philosophy, is altogether due to an accident of education, and not in any measure to inherent proclivities, dependant upon hereditarily transmitted specialities of structure and function, these very specialities being in large part due to racial type, itself the distinctive product of a given Ethnic area. In short, Mr. Mill does not believe in race; and hence the grave errors of his otherwise-admirable works.

And yet there are sentiments, even in some of his earlier writings, which might well have guarded him from these mistakes of his later years. Here, for instance, is an extract from his article on Bentham, in the *London and Westminster Review* for August, 1838, and reprinted in his Dissertations. "For the philosophy of matter, the materials are the properties of matter; for moral and political philosophy, *the properties of man, and of man's position in the world.*" And farther on in the same paragraph, "If in his survey of human nature and life he has left any element out, then, wheresoever that element exerts any influence, his conclusions will fail, more or less, in their application." Precisely so. Mr. Mill in his otherwise masterly "surveys of human nature and life," has left out the very important element of race, and as a necessary result, "wheresoever that element exerts any influence, his conclusions fail in their application," that is, however, truthful to his own race, the Teutonised Celts of Britain; they are, more or less, inapplicable to all other races, more especially those separated from us by such broad lines of demarcation as the Negroid and Mongolic populations of Central Africa and Eastern Asia. Of course, Mr. Mill and his friends will reply, that in the passage in question, and in others of similar import, which might be readily found scattered through his writings, he was not speaking of man in his *physical* relationships at all. And we readily grant this. It is not a part of his philosophic vocation to contemplate man under a material, or, to speak somewhat more definitively, a corporeal aspect. It rather suits his purpose, or shall we say, it better comports with

his frame of mind to speak in "vague generalities" about "human nature" and other "abstractions," which "he has not translated into realities," or subjected to "an exhaustive method of classification," to use some of the pet phrases of the great master of codification, whose life and labours constitute the subject-matter of the article from which we have just been quoting.

Mr. Mill very justly accords great praise to Bentham for never "reasoning about abstractions till they have been translated into realities." Will he pardon us for hinting to him that the abstractions, "man," and "human nature," need such a translation. When we, as Anthropologists, hear of man, we want to know what kind of man. That he is of the GENUS *homo* is not enough for us, we want to know his *species*, and, if possible, the very variety to which he belongs. And any naturalist will inform Mr. Mill that he requires precisely the same kind of information about an animal, before he can pronounce in any detail upon its qualities and attributes, upon its structure and its habits. We can, however, quite understand, that all these things are infinitely beneath the notice of Mr. Mill and his school, who, from the lofty empyrean of their closet philosophy, can afford to look down with unutterable pity upon people who concern themselves about such trifles as the development of the Negro brain, and the possible correlation of mind to so insignificant an organ! What, forsooth, has the proportion of the viscera in different races, to do with "Political Economy," saving and except that some stomachs are more prone to a carnivorous diet than others, and so, perhaps, cost rather more for their sustenance to the body politic? And what have strong or weak impulses, dominant passions, or predominant principles to do with law making, more especially that which is done in the closet. Having your chart of "human nature," can't you codify at your ease, for all times and countries, all climes and races? What is to hinder you? Nothing, my esteemed friend and most profound philosopher, absolutely nothing, we reply, except that most inconvenient of all possible obstructions, FACT; the world-old and world-wide fact of racial diversity, which has hitherto bid defiance to prophets and priests, to princes and legislators, in their benevolent endeavours to convert all mankind to one religion, and subject them to the beneficent restraint of one form of law and government.

The perversity of Mr. Mill in rejecting anthropology as an instrument for investigating the diversities of national character is something marvellous, as an instance of what may almost be called judicial blindness of intellect. Listen to his oracular utterances in the same article from which we have just been quoting: "That which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone enables any body of human

beings to exist as a society, is national character." And in the next page, "A philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national character, is an absurdity." Amen, and again amen, say we, from the anthropological standpoint. Why this is the very pith and marrow of the whole matter. It is what we have been preaching from the very first. It is the burthen of our discourse. It is the very truth which we wish to impress upon statesmen and legislators, and we may add upon political economists, if it be right to name them apart from the foregoing. Oh, Mr. Mill, how nearly transparent is the veil, which nevertheless hides us from each other! It is very obvious that the great logician sees everything, but the fact in nature of organic speciality. To that, from his bookish education, he is blind, perhaps hopelessly so now. Shall we then blame him? Certainly not, but with all his greatness, we must yet, from the very depths of our soul, pity him. To be so near the truth, and yet from a prejudgment to miss it! To be forced to accept a conclusion, and yet from inveterate prejudice, to ignore the very data on which it is based! What will a more enlightened posterity say to the melancholy humiliation of so sad a position!

But, to use the words of Mr. Mill when speaking of Bentham, "it is an ungracious task to call a great benefactor of mankind to account for not being a greater." Mr. Mill is so enlightened and so liberal, with such a breadth of culture and such a true catholicity of sentiment on almost every other subject, that we are almost ashamed to take him thus severely to account for his deficiencies and prejudices on the subject of race. But as anthropologists we cannot but regard it as very important, and indeed we may say without exaggeration, all important, in reference to the very topics treated of, in all other respects, so ably by the great master of logic and political economics, and while we have not the smallest hope of converting him from the error of his ways, we would fain preserve some of his pupils and followers from falling into similar mistakes. We are not lacking in respect for Mr. Mill, nor we trust, wanting in the power to appreciate his great and commanding abilities, and the truly noble purposes to which, with lifelong assiduity, he has applied them. But we cannot blind ourselves to his egregious fallacies, nor can we persuade ourselves that these fallacies, bearing as they do directly on practical questions, are wholly innocuous. They have led him, and they have led inferior men, to make demands for the ruder races, such as science, the science of man, cannot sanction,—demands founded on ignorance of the great facts of race, and in opposition to the laws of nature. Demands all the more dangerous, because coinciding with that pseudo-philanthropy of our age, which starting from groundless assumptions, enthroned as first

principles, proceeds to their stupendous conclusions, in defiance alike of the revelations of science and the teachings of experience. A philanthropy that aims at uniformity where there is diversity; and which, disregarding alike anthropology and history, endeavours to set up the creed and code of Caucasian Christendom as the sole standard to which humanity in all its varieties must hasten to conform. A philanthropy based on the absurdity of a dogma, and which, therefore, can only end in the mortification of defeat, while productive of incalculable mischief in the process of experimentally demonstrating the fallacy of its principles and the groundlessness of its expectations.

We have, in the earlier part of the present article, spoken rather severely of the school to which Mr. Mill belongs. Let it not, however, be for one moment supposed that we would apply these remarks, in all their severity, to him individually, even in his speciality as a writer on legislation and political economy. He has too much good sense, and we may add, too much good feeling, to allow the errors of his school to wholly dominate his better nature. He is in the noblest sense the master of this school, for he is conducting it *through* many of its old errors into higher truths. He sees as clearly as any anthropologist the utter absurdity of attempting to impose European institutions on Asiatic slaves or African savages—in their own country. But because he persistently regards their disqualification for the immediate possession of political liberty, with its equal rights and representative government, as simply a matter of defective education, he does not hesitate to claim the franchise for the recently liberated Negro of the Southern States of America. To him in this connection, the term Negro simply implies a person who has, till within the last few months, unfortunately held an inferior *social* position. But it does not imply, as it does to the anthropologist, a being of inferior *organic* constitution, in whom corporeal function and animal impulse too readily dominate moral sentiment and intellectual aptitude, a being who is not merely a barbarian in his *habits*, but a savage in his *hereditary* proclivities. To this phase of the question, Mr. Mill is both blind and deaf. He will not or he cannot *see* the facts of racial diversity for himself, and he refuses to listen to the statements and conclusions of those who have made this subject the study of a life. To their scientific investigations and the results so far obtained by most carefully conducted observation, results steadily cumulative, he responds, on the old *à priori* method, that is from the seemingly impregnable stronghold of a preconception, in the very foolish words which we have prefixed to this paper. Now these words may perhaps be quite worthy of the school which Mr. Mill so ably represents, and we can conceive of his followers and admirers applauding them to the echo, but they

are not worthy of him. The ablest logician of the nineteenth century should not be so childishly facile in the assumption of his premises. Reasoning, to be of any value, demands something more than unassailable *concatenation*. It must have a tenable *basis*. It must have unassailable data. Now the data in reference to race are the concrete *facts* of race, not *abstract* political principles; they are facts obtained by the process of induction, not first principles evolved by a process of thought. Mr. Mill, in short, has overstepped his province. He has intruded into the domain of science, and hence the unpleasant necessity laid upon us, of warning him off, we trust with respectful civility, but we also hope in words "of no uncertain sound".

We had intended to make some remarks on race in relation to the principles of codification, as laid down by Jeremy Bentham, but such a subject demands special treatment, and could not with advantage be brought in as subsidiary to anything else. It is, however, a matter so intimately connected with, and we may say so entirely dependant for its application on, the facts of race, that we should fail in our duty as anthropologists, were we not to recur to it. At a more convenient season, then, we propose to again direct the reader's attention to legislation and political economy, and the important bearing of anthropological science on these two great departments of thought and action.

ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.*

SOME time since the Rev. Frederic W. Farrar published a work on the *Origin of Language*, in which he enforced, with much strength of argument, the onomatopoeitic theory. In 1861 Professor Max Müller delivered, at the Royal Institute, a series of lectures on "the Science of Language", wherein he endeavoured to trace its origin to the possession by man of general ideas represented in language by *roots*, as opposed to the theories of imitation and interjection. These lectures have called forth a reply from Mr. Farrar in another work, entitled, *Chapters on Language*; and we think his endeavours to meet the various objections to the onomatopoeitic theory have been attended with no small degree of success. Mr. Farrar, after endeavouring to show that

* *Chapters on Language*. By the Rev. Frederic W. Farrar, M.A. London: Longmans. 1865.